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Abstract
Author of the article argues that in spite of a subjectivist nature of Max Stirner’s 
thought	which	 is	distinct	 from	 libertarianism,	 there’s	 a	 strong	 intellectual	 affinity	
between	anarchist	wing	of	it	and	Stirner’s	conception.	This	position	is	based	on	three	
crucial arguments. First, Stirner’s opus magnum The Ego and Its Own is one of the 
most	zealous	declarations	of	social	individualism	based	upon	the	idea	of	self-own-
ership. Second, the Archimedean point of both analyzed political philosophies is the 
idea	of	spontaneous	order,	i.e.	the	conviction	that	the	efficient	cooperation	between	
egoistic individuals – and thus not mediated by any external constraints - is possible. 
Third,	there	are	important	historical	connections	between	Stirner’s	conception	and	
representatives of individualistic or libertarian anarchism.
Keywords: Max Stirner, egoism, spontaneus order, individualist anarchism.
Resumen
El autor de este artículo argumenta que, a pesar de la naturaleza subjetivista del 
pensamiento de Max Stirner, en este sentido distinto del libertarismo, existe una 
fuerte	afinidad	intelectual	entre	la	rama	anarquista	del	libertarismo	y	la	concepción	
de Stirner. Esta tesis se basa en tres argumentos esenciales. En primer lugar, la obra 
principal de Stirner, El único y su propiedad, representa uno de los más entusias-
tas pronunciamientos en favor del individualismo social basado en la idea de au-
topropiedad.	En	 segundo	 lugar,	 la	 clave	 de	 bóveda	 de	 las	 dos	 filosofías	 políticas	
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analizadas es la idea del orden espontáneo, es decir, la convicción de la posibilidad 
de	una	cooperación	eficiente	entre	individuos	egoístas	sin	mediación	de	coerciones	
externas. En tercer lugar, hay conexiones históricas importantes entre la concepción 
de Stirner y los representantes del anarquismo individualista o libertario. 
Palabras clave: Max Stirner, egoísmo, orden espontáneo, anarquismo individu-
alista.
An approach to Stirner’s thought presented by libertarians is deeply ambivalent. 
It	 is,	without	 the	doubt,	 the	subjectivist	nature	of	his	conception,	which	bears	 the	
particular responsibility for this ambivalence.1	However,	unless	I	am	mistaken,	this	
subjectivism should be explained primarily by a polemical context of his philosophy, 
i.e. by Stirner’s radical opposition to an anti-individualist ideology (Hegelianism) 
and oppressive practice of authoritarian Prussian state (the so-called “bureaucratic 
absolutism” and militarism).2 Therefore, this subjectivism results from an intellec-
tual climate of Stirner’s thought, deeply rooted in the convention of German young 
Hegelianism,	which	was	unfamiliar	to	libertarian	rhetoric	–	objectivist	and	based	on	
natural	law	theory.	However,	I	am	convinced	that	despite	this	dissimilarity,	there	ex-
ists	a	deep	intellectual	relationship	between	Stirner	and	libertarianism.	I	can	present	
four	underlying	reasons	supporting	this	thesis.	First,	the	main	Stirner’s	work	entitled	
The Ego And His Own  (Eng. trans: 1907), (orig.: 1846, Der Eizige und Sein Eigen-
tum),	is	without	a	doubt	one	of	the	most	zealous	declarations	of	social	individualism	
based	on	the	idea	of	self-ownership	in	the	history	of	political	and	social	philosophy	
at all.3	 The	 individualism	 based	 on	 the	 idea	 of	 self-ownership	 also	 constitutes	 a	
basis of libertarian thought.4 Second, the “Archimedean point” of both of these 
political philosophies is the idea of spontaneous order – i.e. a conviction that free co-
operation	between	egoistic	individuals	can	be	efficient	and	possible.	Third,	there	are	
obvious	historic	connections	between	Stirner’s	conception	and	representatives	of	in-
dividualist	-	as	well	as	libertarian	-	anarchism	(for	example:	J.	H.	Mackay,	J.	Walker,	
B. R. Tucker).5	And	finally	Stirner’s	subjectivist	standpoint	 is	 radically	weakened	
1 A. Rand, Virtue of Selfishness. A New Concept of Egoism,	New	York,	Signet,	1964,	p.	129.
2	For	further	details	see:	M.	Chmieliński,	Max Stirner. Jednostka, społeczeństwo, państwo (Max Stirner. 
An Individual, a Society and the State),	Kraków,	Księgarnia	Akademicka	2006,	p.	45.
3 On the individualism in general see e.g.: S. Lukes, Individualism, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 
1973.
4 E. g. M. N. Rothbard,  The Ethics of Liberty,	New	York	and	London,	New	York	University	Press	
1998,	p.	113;	idem, For a New Liberty. A Libertarian Manifesto,	New	York:	Macmillan	1978,	p.	28;	D.	
Boaz, Libertarianism. A Primer,	New	York,	The	Free	Press,	1997,	p.	97.	Still	one	of	the	most	interesting	
polemics	 with	 the	 libertarian	 thesis	 of	 the	 self-ownership	 remains:	 G.	 A	 Cohen,	 Self-ownership, 
Freedom and Equality, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1995.
5 John	 Henry	 Mackay	 discovered	 Stirner,	 Benjamin	 Tucker	 published	 the	 first	 English	 translation	
of The Ego and His Own,	James	L.	Walker	was	the	first	person	to	 introduce	Max	Stirner’s	 ideas	 to	
Maciej Chmieliński Self-ownership and Spontaneously-Evolved Order...
Res Publica. Revista de Historia de las Ideas Políticas 
Vol. 19 Núm. 2 (2016): 459-476
461
by his conception of the “unions of egoists” (Verein der Egoisten),	which	requires	
a mutual cooperation in the achieving necessary common goals, like for example – 
security and therefore has to make his conception of egoism more “objectivistic”.6
In this article, I pay no attention to issues of purely historical nature, mentioning 
them	only	in	footnotes	and	only	if	necessary.	Whereas,	I	will	consider	those	elements	
of	Stirner’s	conception,	that	enable	capturing	substantive	affinities	between	his	con-
ception	and	libertarianism,	as	well	as	the	most	important	differences	between	them.	
Thus,	I	will	start	with	discussing	(1.)	the	anti-metaphysical	concept	of	freedom	for-
mulated	by	Stirner,	then	I	will	present	his	(2.)	idea	of	self-ownership	and	its	external	
expansion	and	(3.)	the	vision	of	spontaneous	order.	Concluding	I	would	also	like	to	
comment on the fundamental point of the libertarian criticism of Stirner’s concep-
tion, i.e. on the charge of subjectivism.
1.	‟Absolute	coercion”	and	‟absolute	freedom”.	The	anti-metaphysical	vision	of	
freedom in Stirner’s conception
The	ultimate	goal	of	Stirner’s	work	The Ego and his own,	which	can	be	seen	even	
as	his	obsession,	is	to	describe	the	fundamental	conditions,	which	let	the	unique	and	
original individual life free from each outside coercion7. In Stirner’s opinion: “He 
who	is	infatuated	with	Man leaves persons out of account so far as that infatuation 
extends,	and	floats	in	an	ideal,	sacred	interest.	Man, you see, is not a person, but an 
ideal, a spook”.8 Thus, “No, community, as the “goal” of history hitherto, is impos-
sible. Let us rather renounce every hypocrisy of community, and recognize that, if 
we	are	equal	as	men,	we	are	not	equal	for	the	very	reason	that	we	are	not	men.	We	
are equal only in thoughts, only	when	“we”	are	thought, not	as	we	really	and	bodily	
English-speaking anarchists (and others) in Benjamin Tucker’s publication, Liberty. In his book 
The Philosophy of Egoism,	Walker	summarized	his	understanding	of	egoism	as	drawn	from	Stirner.	
They are the main representatives of individualist anarchism and often are seen as the pioneers of 
libertarianism. See: J. L. Walker, The Philosophy of Egoism,	Denver,	Katherine	Walker,	1905;	 idem 
(under pseudonym TAK KAK), “Stirner on Justice”, in Liberty, Vol. IV, No. 18, Boston, March 26, 
1887;	J.H.	Mackay,	Max Stirner. Sein Leben und sein Werk	(Reprint	der	3.	Aufl.),	Freiburg/Br,	Mackay	
Gesellschaft, 1977, B. R. Tucker, Instead of Book. By a Men Too Busy to Write One,	New	York,	B.	
Tucker,	1897.	About	the	complicated	relations	between	Stirner	and	Anarchists,	see:	J.	F.	Welsh,	Max 
Stirner’s Dialectical Egoism. A New Interpretation, Lanham, Lexington Books, 2010, p.117, B. Laska, 
“Die Individualanarchisten und Max Stirner”, in H. J. Degen (ed.), Lexikon der Anarchie, Bösdorf, 
Verlag	Schwarzen	Nachtschatten,	1996,	p.	11.
6	In	the	sense	of	philosophy	of	“objectivism”	of	Ayn	Rand,	the	philosophy	of	which	is	Rand	famous	
for	and	which	reflects	another	value	of	Newtonian	physics,	which	is	objectivity.
7 Hence	the	motto	of	the	main	work	of	Stirner	entitled	The Ego and His Own,	which	is	:	‟All	Things	are	
nothing	to	me”	(‟Ich	hab	mein	Sach	uf	Nichts	gestellt”)	and	it	means	a	lack	of		external	constraints	for	
thinking	and	attempting	to	(challenging	and	ill-fated	anyway)	think	extra-conceptually,	which	signifies	
thinking	in	as	concrete	categories	as	possible.	For	further	details,	see:	(M.	Chmieliński,	op. cit., p. 155)
8 M. Stirner, The Ego and His Own,	New	York,	B.	Tucker,	1907,	p.	52.
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are.	I	am	ego,	and	you	are	ego:	but	I	am	not	this	thought	of	ego;	this	ego	in	which	
we	are	all	equal	is	only	my thought. I am man, and you are man: but “man” is only 
a	thought,	a	generality;	neither	you	nor	I	are	speakable,	we	are	unutterable, because 
only thoughts are speakable and consist in speaking”.9 And therefore, he research-
es	any	possible	sources	of	coercion	with	all	 the	depth	of	abstract	 thinking,	which	
was	characteristic	for	the	19th	century	German	speculative	philosophy.	Thus,	Stirner	
doesn’t limit his conception of coercion to the objective, common-sense character 
of	it,	present	 i.e.	 in	 the	formal	authority	of	 the	State’s	power.	He	finds	sources	of	
coercion much deeper, in a subjective plane of individual’s existence. The coercion 
is	 for	Stirner	 everything,	what	 limits	 an	 individual	 and	 subjects	her	or	him	 to	 an	
external	will,	even	if	it	is	simply	an	objective	vision	of	a	proper	conduct,	which	is	
inherent in social conventions, contracts or other social institutions. What’s more, 
according	to	Stirner	the	source	of	coercion	can	be	even	your	own	idea	or	opinion,	if	
it	is	strong	enough,	that	you	can’t	emancipate	yourself	from	it	when	needed.	There-
fore, the source of coercion is for him not only the State and its institutions but also 
morality,	religion,	natural	law	-	paradoxically	–	the	freedom	itself	can	become	it,	if	
it	is	understood	as	an	“idée	fixe”,	the	idea	at	implementation	of	which	one	should	
necessarily aim. 10	In	other	words,	all	what	gives	you	no	possibility	of	change	can	
be the source coercion.
If	the	area	of	coercion	is	by	Stirner	widened	so	radically	(almost	ad	absurdum),	
so	the	area	of	emancipation	from	it	has	to	be	outlined	equally	wide.11 Thus freedom 
9 Ibidem, p. 414.
10  “Under	religion	and	politics	man	finds	himself	at	the	standpoint	of	should: he should become this 
and that, should be so and so. With this postulate, this commandment, every one steps not only in front 
of	another	but	also	in	front	of	himself.	Those	critics	say:	You	should	be	a	whole,	free	man.	Thus	they	too	
stand	in	the	temptation	to	proclaim	anew	religion,	to	set	up	a	new	absolute,	an	ideal	–	to	wit,	freedom.”	
(Ibidem, p. 125).
11  Such	widening	of	borderlines	of	freedom	is	pointedly	ridiculed	by	Isaiah	Berlin,	who	writes:	‟If	I	
use	the	word	‘yellow’	I	want	to	mean	by	it	what	I	meant	by	it	yesterday	and	what	you	will	mean	by	it	
tomorrow.	But	this	is	a	terrible	yoke,	this	is a	fearful	despotism.	Why	should	the	word	‘yellow’	mean	the	
same	thing	now	and	tomorrow?	Why	cannot	I	alter	it?	Why	should	twice	2	always	make	4?	Why	should	
words	be	uniform?	Why	cannot	I	make	up	my	own	universe	each	time	I	begin?	But	if	I	do	that,	if	there	is	
no systematic symbolism, then I cannot think. If I cannot think, I go mad. To do him justice, Stirner did 
duly go mad. He ended his life very honourably and very consistently in a lunatic asylum as a perfectly 
peaceful harmless lunatic, in 1856.” (I. Berlin, The Roots of Romanticism,	Princeton	 -	New	Jersey,	
Princeton University Press 2001, p. 144). Disregarding Berlin’s total ignorance as far as biographical 
issues are concerned (from this information only the date of death is correct), you need to pay attention 
to	 poor	 knowledge	 of	 Stirner’s	 conception.	 Stirner	 does	 not	 fight	with	 universalia	 in	 the	medieval	
nominalists	fashion,	i.	e.	for	refutation	of	a	conviction	about	real	existence	of	abstracts.	However,	he	
points	to	the	existence	of	supraindividual	institutions,	through	which	authority	is	exercised	over	human:	
ideology,	propaganda	and	Utopian	vision	of	future	paradise,	which	“here	and	now”	requires	personal	
sacrifices,	that	is	Stirner	actually	points	to	similar	issues	that	Berlin	does	in	his	famous	singling	out	the	
concept of positive liberty.
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means	for	him	freedom	from	all,	what	externally	or	internally	limits	our	individual	
will,	and	at	the	same	time	-	freedom	to	all	that,	what	is	needed	by	the	individual.	
In	this	view	freedom	means	the	pre-ethical	attitude	to	stay	in	accordance	only	with	
one’s	own,	individual	needs.	It	is	neither	Rousseauian	“civil	liberty”12 nor Kantian 
rational freedom13, nor Lockean conception of freedom limited by freedom of other 
people14, i.e. by the natural rights of others. To paraphrase Robert Nozick’s famous 
sentence, the freedom of an individual is, according to Stirner, the freedom “to place 
a	knife	in	somebody’s	abdomen”.	It’s	scope	is	limited	only	by	the	power	of	the	con-
crete individual (Ger. Macht or Gewalt,	Eng.	“might”).	‟My	freedom	becomes	com-
plete	only	when	it	is	my	–	might”15 “(…) for the means that I use for it are determined 
by	what	I	am.	If	I	am	weak,	I	have	only	weak	means”.16 According to the German 
thinker,	who	has	more	power,	is	simply	more	free.
According	to	Stirner,	such	an	understanding	of	freedom	is	a	well	established	or	
common	fact	which	cannot	be	called	into	question.	Stirner’s	conception	of	freedom	
has not the normative character, but descriptive one. In his thinking about rationale 
and motives of human’s behavior Stirner is close to political realism. According to 
him, there are no convincing empirical evidences that freedom is internally limited 
in	any	way,	and	if	so,	then	we	have	to	understand	freedom	in	its	negative	aspect	in	
the	simplest	way,	that	is	actually	as	a	lack	of	any	restraints17. An assumption of the 
internal	 limits	of	 freedom	always	adopts	a	metaphysical	fiction,	which	clouds	 the	
real	picture	of	human’s	conduct.	Conceptions	of	“civilized”,	‟rational”	freedom,	or	
“freedom	 limited	by	 the	 freedom	of	others’”	are	 for	Stirner	metaphysical	fictions	
covering some form of its external limitation. They are used for various motives: 
sometimes in order to set a noble ideal for human’s behavior, to create a moral an-
chor	-	principles	preventing	from	violations	of	other	people’s	freedom;	sometimes	it	
12  Rousseau	describes	the	difference	between	civil	and	natural	liberty	as	follows:	“Let	us	draw	up	the	
whole	account	 in	 terms	easily	commensurable.	What	men	 loses	by	 the	social	contract	 is	his	natural	
liberty	and	an	unlimited	right	to	everything	he	tries	to	get	and	succeeds	in	getting;	what	he	gains	is	civil	
liberty	and	the	proprietorship	of	all	he	possesses.	If	we	are	to	avoid	Mistake	in	weighing	one	against	
the	other,	we	must	 clearly	distinguish	natural	 liberty,	which	 is	bounded	only	by	 the	 strength	of	 the	
individual,	from	civil	liberty,	which	is	limited	by	the	general	will”	(J.	J.	Rousseau,	“Social	Contract”,	
in Philosophy and Theology,	E.	Rhys	(ed.),	London,	Dent;	1923,	p.	19).
13 I. Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1991, p. 185.
14 J. Locke, Two Treatises of Government, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1960, p. 269.
15  M. Stirner, op. cit., p. 92.
16 Ibidem, p. 91.
17 Similarly	 understands	 freedom	Thomas	 Hobbes,	 for	 whom:	 “The	 right	 of	 nature,	 which	 writers	
commonly call jus naturale,	is	the	liberty	each	man	hath	to	use	his	own	power	as	he	will	himself	for	
the	preservation	of	his	own	nature;	that	is	to	say,	of	his	own	life;	and	consequently,	of	doing	anything	
which,	in	his	own	judgment	and	reason,	he	shall	conceive	to	be	the	aptest	means	thereunto.”	(T.	Hobbes,	
Leviathan or The Matter, Form & Power of a Common-wealth Ecclesiastical and Civil, London, Green 
Dragon, 1651, p. 79).
Maciej Chmieliński Self-ownership and Spontaneously-Evolved Order...
Res Publica. Revista de Historia de las Ideas Políticas    
Vol. 19 Núm. 2 (2016): 459-476
464
is	simply	a	form	of	encouraging	himself	when	somebody	is	enslaved	(e.g.	Epictetus	
and the stoic idea of inner freedom).
But	Stirner’s	conception	of	freedom	should	not,	however,	be	interpreted	as	a	pos-
tulate	to	deprive	freedom	of	all	constraints.	He	is	concerned	rather	with	not	masking	
them	with	any	metaphysical	fictions	suggesting	that	there	exists	some	alleged	form	
of	freedom,	which	already	in	its	substance	is	different	from	that,	which	we	common-
ly	conceive	as	 freedom.	Hence,	 in	my	view,	a	significant	part	of	Stirner’s	 radical	
and strongly exaggerated statements should be explained by his politically realistic 
standpoint,	which	express	itself	in	excluding	each	metaphysical	fiction	and	aiming	
for authenticity of statement. For him this authenticity is clearly missing in the spec-
ulative political philosophy of his times and in practice of the Prussian State.
Thus, the borders of freedom are for Stirner necessary, but they must have a lib-
ertarian character. The libertarian character of it manifests itself in a postulate that as 
many of the limitations of freedom as possible has to be a result of free decisions or 
mutual	voluntary	agreements.	Stirner	knows	that	the	communities	without	any	lim-
itations	of	its	members	are	impossible	and	inefficient,	because	using	freedom	with	
no	regard	for	others,	is	contrary	to	common	sense	and	inefficient.	Also	the	power	of	
an	individual,	on	which	its	freedom	is	dependent,	is	for	him	not	a	purely	physical	
advantage but above all an energy serving human to handle various life situations. 
Whereas, they usually require cooperation.18
2. Self-ownership and its external expansion
Similarly as in the tradition reaching back to John Locke, freedom is for Stirner 
connected	with	property	in	such	a	manner,	that	an	individual	is	free	within	bounda-
ries	of	his	or	her	ownership.	As	noted	above,	freedom	and	ownership	are	not	under-
stood	by	Stirner	in	categories	of	a	natural	law	theory,	which	assumes	some	a	priori	
limitations of freedom by the freedom of others (thus in opposition to the Locke’an 
tradition).	 It	 is	 rather	 a	 ‟Viking’s	 freedom”,	 that	 expresses	 itself	 in	 ability	 of	 the	
individual	to	appropriate	all	that,	what	is	possible	regarding	the	power	of	individual	
and	with	no	pre-established	 restrictions	 (for	 instance	Lockean	proviso).	The	each	
individual’s	property	is	determined	only	by	the	power	of	this	individual.	Moreover,	
according	to	Stirner	it	is	this	ability	to	appropriate,	which	creates	the	positive	aspect	
of	freedom.	Without	this	positive	aspect	however	we	cannot	imagine	the	freedom	
of a particular individual19:	“I	have	no	objection	to	freedom,	but	I	wish	more	than	
18  M. Stirner, op. cit., p. 409.
19  The similar approach to freedom seems to be represented by such contemporary authors like G.A 
Cohen	and	Matthew	Kramer.	See:	(G.	A.	Cohen,	op. cit.,	p.	92;	idem, History, Labour and Freedom. 
Themes from Marx,	Oxford,	Clarendon	Press,	1988,	p.	286;	I.	Carter,	M.	Kramer,	H.	Steiner,	Freedom. 
A philosophical Anthology,	Oxford,	Blackwell,	2007,	p.	4;	M.	Kramer,	The Quality of Freedom, Oxford, 
Oxford University Press, 2003, p. 3).
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freedom for you” – says Stirner - “you should not merely be rid of	what	you	do	
not	want;	you	should	not	only	be	a	“freeman”,	you	should	be	an	“owner”	 too”20. 
Stirner	defines	this	unity	of	freedom	and	appropriation	as	“ownness”	-	Eigenheit (a 
compound	of	two	German	words:	freedom	–	Freiheit	and	ownership	–	Eigentum).21 
Thereby	he	comprehends	ownership	as	 everything	 that,	over	which	an	 individual	
has	control	and	what	is	a	subject	of	its	use.	First	of	all,	it	is	a	human	himself/herself,	
whose	self-ownership	“emanates”	in	a	natural	way	on	objects	of	the	external	world.	
Thus,	the	appropriation	embodies	the	essence	of	man’s	relationship	to	the	world	of	
things	and	the	world	of	people.	Both	things	as	well	as	people	are	mainly	objects,	
they have instrumental value, they are used for meeting needs and implementation of 
objectives. For Stirner it is a fact similar to this, that freedom is strictly dependent on 
the	power	of	an	individual;	thus,	it	is	a	fact,	with	which	there	is	no	point	to	argue.	For	
Stirner calling this obvious fact into question on the one hand can serve maintain-
ing	or	strengthening	the	symbolic	power	over	people	by	various	public	authorities	
(the	State,	churches,	moral	authorities),	or	on	the	other	hand	is	equate	with	belief	in	
useless	fictions.	In	this	first	case,	the	public	authorities	impose	on	the	individual	ob-
ligations,	which	are	useless	and	unnecessary	from	this	individual’s	point	of	view,	and	
which	this	individual	will	never	impose	on	itself,	because	it	contradicts	its	interests.	
The	second	reason	for	the	questioning	of	the	power-dependent	nature	of	property	is	
to	be	very	often	an	integrity	or	finesse	of	an	ethical	system,	but	that	Stirner	is	not	
concerned on.22
Therefore, according to Stirner, it is this instrumental relationship that inter-per-
sonal	relations	should	be	built	on.	Any	other	ways	of	creating	relationships	between	
really	existing	individuals	are	based	on	a	wrong	or	false	image	of	the	human	world.	
According to Stirner, the conscious instrumental relation is – paradoxically – the 
most authentic relation. It is not mediated by a false respect for a man’s dignity and 
humanist	ideals,	yet	it	takes	its	origin	from	respect	for	this	benefit,	which	we	can	reap	
from this or that particular man. “For me you are nothing but –my food, even as I too 
am fed upon and turned to use by you. We have only one relation to each other, that 
of usableness, of utility, of use”.23	Then	his	point	of	view	is	definitely	anti-Kantian,	
anti-humanist	and	contrary	 to	 the	natural	 law	theory.	 In	Stirner’s	approach	a	man	
is	evaluated	by	others	like	a	good	table	or	a	good	horse;	there	is	any	place	for	an	
universal,	unconditioned	or	internal	value,	and	the	only	measure	is	the	benefit	for	
others,	or	–	the	utility,	which	he	represents	for	other	man.	Stirner	again	expresses	
here	his	conviction,	that	we	should	stop	invoking	false	sentiments	and	stereotypes.	
However	we	have	to	remember,	that	for	Stirner	this	strictly	instrumental	character	of	
20 M. Stirner, op. cit., p. 87.
21 J. P. Clark, Max Stirner’s Egoism, London, Freedom Press 1976, p. 59.
22 M. Stirner, op. cit., p. 42.
23 Ibidem, p. 149.
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the inter-individual or interpersonal relationships does not exclude strong emotional 
relationships	and	even	sacrifice	for	others.	This	is	key	thesis	of	the	Stirner’s	subjec-
tivist	approach	to	egoism,	which	says	that	even	the	sacrifice	for	others	or	a	“selfless	
love”	is	motivated	solely	by	selfish	needs.	In	this	probably	logical	untenable	stance	
of	Stirner,	every	conduct	and	action,	which	isn’t	determined	by	an	external	factor	or	
motivation, but comes immediately from the inside – i.a. from the individual’s needs 
and	wants	itself	–	has	the	selfish	character.	Already	the	autonomous	decision	that	is	
freely	made	by	an	individual	determines	the	selfish	character	of	such	an	action.	In	
this	sense,	also	love	for	other	person,	friendship	and	sacrifice	is	evaluated	as	egois-
tic.24
Stirner’s assumption of the instrumental treatment of others does not mean then 
a	proto-nazist	or	fascist	justification	for	“converting	them	into	soap”.25 On the con-
trary,	Stirner	wants	in	this	way	to	eliminate	hypocrisy	and	falsity	from	human	rela-
tionships. He points out that instrumentalization cannot be avoided in direct relation-
ships,	as	for	one	man	the	other	one	is	always	subject	of	concern,	feelings	or	goals:	a	
24 Though, this explanation of egoism seems to resemble the Aristotle’s explanation included in 
Nicomachean Ethics,	where	he	convinces	that	also	those,	who	sacrifice	for	others	and	grant	them	favors	
do	so	not	out	of	altruism,	but	above	all	for	fulfillment	of	their	own	need	to	help	others,	so	out	of	egoism.	
“If,	therefore,	we	should	grasp	how	each	side	is	speaking	of	the	self-lover,	perhaps	the	matter	would	
become	clear.	Now,	then,	those	who	bring	self-love	into	reproach	call	“self-lovers”	those	people	who	
allot to themselves the greater share of money, honors, and bodily pleasures, for the many long for 
these	things	and	are	serious	about	them	on	the	grounds	that	they	are	what	is	best;	hence	too	such	things	
are	fought	over.	Those	who	grasp	for	more	of	these	things	gratify	their	desires	and,	in	general,	their	
passions and the nonrational part of their soul. Such is the character of the many. Hence too this familiar 
term	of	reproach	has	arisen	from	the	case	that	mostly	prevails,	which	is	indeed	base.	Those	who	are	
self-lovers	in	this	way,	therefore,	are	justly	reproached.	It	is	not	unclear	that	the	many	are	accustomed	to	
saying	that	those	who	allot	such	things	to	themselves	are	self-lovers.	For	if	someone	should	always	take	
seriously	that	he	himself	do	what	is	just,	or	moderate,	or	whatever	else	accords	with	the	virtues,	and,	in	
general,	if	he	should	secure	what	is	noble	for	himself,	no	one	would	say	that	he	is	a	“self-lover”	or	even	
blame	him.	But	this	sort	of	person	would	seem	to	be	more of	a	self-lover;	at	any	rate,	he	allots	to	himself	
the	noblest	things	and	the	greatest	goods,	he	gratifies	the	most	authoritative	part	of	himself,	and	in	all	
things	he	obeys	this	part.	Just	as	a	city	and	every	other	whole	composed	of	parts	seem	to	be	their	most	
authoritative part above all, so too does a human being. ” (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Chicago, 
The University of Chicago Press, 2011, p. 200/201). The prevailing part of current interpretations of 
the	political	philosophy	of	Aristotle	are	 today	communitarian,	but	 there	are	 some	Authors,	who	are	
founding in Aristotle foundations of the individualism. See: T. Machan, Classical Individualism, The 
Supreme Importance of Each Human Being,	London	and	New	York,	Routledge,	1998,	p.	xiii.
25 Hans	 G.	 Helms	 presents	 the	 view	 that	 Stirner	 created	 “the	 first	 consistent	 formulation	 ...	 of	 the	
ideology of the middle class’ and further that Hitler	articulated	a	specifically	middle-class	ideology	and	
that Stirner-ism and National Socialism are both variations upon the same fascist demons.” (H. G. Helms, 
Die Ideologie der anonymen Gesellschaft,	Köln,	DuMont	Schauberg,	1966,	pp.	1-5,	481);	to	explain	
the	macabre	mental	short-cut	used	by	me,	I	will	only	remind	that	during	World	War	II	in	concentration	
camps the Germans committed barbaric practices consisting among others in manufacturing of soap 
from	human	fat,	pallets	 from	human	hair	or	 lamp	shades	 from	human	skin	with	 tattoos,	what	 is	an	
obvious example of a radically instrumental treatment of a human. 
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particular	employer	instrumentalizes	an	employee,	who	becomes	for	him	an	instru-
ment	to	carry	out	some	work,	a	friend	instrumentalizes	a	friend,	who	is	a	receiver	
and a subject of his or her friendship, a loving man – instrumentalizes the object of 
his or her love. Egoism is for Stirner an synonym for the authentic interest, authentic 
relationship and it is not “(…) an opposite of love, opposite of thinking, an enemy of 
a	sweet	sex	life,	enemy	of	commitment	and	sacrifice,	an	enemy	of	great	cordiality,	
nor	an	enemy	of	criticism,	an	enemy	of	socialism;	in	short,	an	enemy	of	a	real	inter-
est:	it	does	not	exclude	any	interest.	It	is	only	directed	against	unselfishness	and	that	
what	is	selfless:	not	against	love,	but	against	sacred	(Ger.	heilige) love, not against 
thinking, yet against sacred thinking, not against socialists, yet against saint social-
ists	etc.	“Exclusiveness”	of	an	egoist,	which	you	would	like	to	explain	as	“isolation”	
(Isoliertheit), “alienation” (Vereinzelung), “solitude” (Vereinsammung), is quite the 
contrary a full participation	 [M.	Stirner	emphasizes]	 in	 the	 interest	 through	–	ex-
clusion	of	that,	what	is	selfless”.26 Thus, every man is a subject only for himself or 
herself,	and	relationships	where	some	individual	interest	doesn’t	exist	are	for	Stirner	
too abstract to be real and authentic inter-individual relationships. What all the peo-
ple, i.a. men living in France and in Australia or Inuits and an inhabitants of Central 
Africa, have in common is of course the humanity, but this is too abstract fundament 
to	build	authentic	relationship	between	them.
What is more, Stirner believes that only perception of individual as a concrete, 
bodily	and	spiritual	wholeness27 enables him to bear full responsibility for his ac-
tions	and	exclude	justification	of	it	neither	by	relating	to	noble	reasons	or	objectives	
nor	by	relating	to	obedience	to	orders	and	standards.	Differently	than	in	the	signifi-
cant part of the previous ethical tradition, the autonomous decision of an individual 
is for Stirner also a decision made on the basis of emotional reasons and dictated 
by beliefs and faith. If I perceive myself in concrete categories of interest, then e.g. 
as a inquisitor I cannot justify taking part in a crime by the service of God, and as 
26	 “Egoismus	 ist	 kein	 Gegensatz	 zur	 Liebe,	 kein	 Gegensatz	 zum	Denken,	 kein	 Feind	 lines	 süssen	
Liebeslebens, kein Feind der Hingebung Und Aufopferung, kein Feind der innigsten Herzlichkeit, 
aber	 auch	 kein	 Feind	 der	 Kritik,	 kein	 Feind	 des	 Sozialismus,	 kurz	 kein	 Feind	 lines	 wirklichen	
Interesses: er schliesst kein Interesse aus. Nur gegen die Uninteressiertheit und das Uninteressant ist 
er gerichtet, nicht gegen die Liebe, sondern gegen die heilige Liebe, nich gegen das Denken, sondern 
gegen	das	heilige	Denken,	nich	gegen	die	Sicialisten,	sondern	gegen	die	heiligen	Socialisten	u.s.w..	
Die	 “Ausschliesslichkeit”	 des	 Egoisten,	 die	 Man	 für	 “Isolirtheit,	 Vereinzelung,	 Vereinsammung”	
ausgeben möchte, ist im Gegentheil volle Betheil igung am Interessanten durch – Ausschliessung des 
Uninteressanten.” This citation comes from published by J. H. Mackay in 1914 collection of  Stirner’s 
articles entitled “Max Stirner’s Kleinere Schriften Und Seine Entgegnungen auf die Kritik seines 
Werkes	 ‘Der	Einzige	Und	sein	Eigenthum’	aus	den	Jahren	1842-1848”,	 that	was	not	 translated	 into	
English language (M. Stirner, Max Stirner’s Kleinere Schriften und seine Entgegnungen auf die Kritik 
seines Werkes “Der Einzige und sein Eigenthum” aus den Jahren 1842-1848,	2.	Aufl.,	Treptow	bei	
Berlin: Bernhard Zack’s Verlag, 1914, p. 144).
27 Welsh, op. cit., p. 31.
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an executioner – by the service to the State. Of course it has the consequence, that 
even as a saint or a national hero I cannot demand common gratitude, because in the 
perspective presented by Stirner, both of these attitudes are grounded on subjectivis-
tically understood egoism.28
3. Spontaneous order in the society of egoists
Therefore, the subjectivistically understood egoism not only does not break up 
inter-human relations, but it simply establishes them. Similarly to philosophical tra-
dition starting from Mandeville, through Hobbes, Holbach, Helvetius, Smith and 
Bentham	 to	Ayn	Rand,	Stirner	 defines	 egoism	 also	 as	 a	 self-preservation	 instinct	
and	a	will	of	providing	oneself	with	as	good	conditions	of	existence	as	possible.29 
In this realistic tradition, a human is understood as interested above all in himself or 
herself,	his	or	her	own	survival	and	good,	and	in	the	second	place	and	alternatively	
–	in	survival	and	good	of	other	people.	Apart	from	Hobbes’s	case,	who	adds	a	Mach-
iavellian element to it, the assumption of egoism in this tradition does not imply an 
universality	of	murderous	instincts	(leading	to	continuous	“war	of	every	one	against	
every one”) and an necessary social atomization30.	 “What	 in	 the	whole	world”	 –	
asks	Stirner	–	“does	the	egoism	have	in	common	with	“isolation”	(Isolirung)? Do 
I	(Ego)	become	an	egoist	owing	to	the	fact	that	I	avoid	people?	Yes,	I	isolate	and	
alienate myself, but I am not egoistic because of that not by inches more than Others, 
who	stay	among	people	enjoying	their	company”.31	In	other	words,	egoism	does	not	
28 J. Jenkins, “Max Stirner’s Egoism”, in Heythrop Journal 50(2), 2009, p. 247.
29 The	 view	 regarding	 egoism	 as	 a	 main	 reason	 of	 human’s	 action	 and	 a	 sign	 of	 a	 healthy	 self-
preservation instinct, that leads to cooperation and constitutes a bond of intra-human relations is 
characteristic	mostly	for	the	tradition	of	Anglo-Saxon	empiricism,	on	which	rely	also	such	libertarians	
as for example Ayn Rand. See e. g. T. Hobbes, “De Corpore Politico”, in The English Works of Thomas 
Hobbes of Malmesbury in XI Volumes,	Vol.	IV,	London,	John	Bohn,	1839-45,	p.	83;	B.	de	Mandeville,	
The Fable of the Bees,	New	York,	Capricorn	Books,	1962,	p.	41;	A.	Rand,	op. cit.
30 Hobbes	combines	conviction	about	egoistic	nature	of	a	human	with	Machiavellian	assumption	that	a	
human	is	in	fact	evil	and	prone	to	violence:	“Hereby	it	is	manifest	that	during	the	time	men	live	without	
a	common	power	to	keep	them	all	in	awe,	they	are	in	that	condition	which	is	called	war;	and	such	a	war	
as	is	of	every	man	against	every	man.	For	war	consisteth	not	in	battle	only,	or	the	act	of	fighting,	but	
in	a	tract	of	time,	wherein	the	will	to	contend	by	battle	is	sufficiently	known:	and	therefore	the	notion	
of	time	is	to	be	considered	in	the	nature	of	war,	as	it	is	in	the	nature	of	weather.	For	as	the	nature	of	
foul	weather	lieth	not	in	a	shower	or	two	of	rain,	but	in	an	inclination	thereto	of	many	days	together:	
so	the	nature	of	war	consisteth	not	in	actual	fighting,	but	in	the	known	disposition	thereto	during	all	the	
time there is no assurance to the contrary. All other time is peace.” (T. Hobbes, Leviathan..., op. cit., p. 
77/78).
31 “Was in aller Welt hat aber der Egoismus mit der Isolirtheit zu Schaffen. Werde Ich (Ego) dadurch 
z.B.	 ein	 Egoist,	 dass	 Ich	 die	 Menschen	 fliehe?	 Ich	 Isolire	 oder	 vereinsame	Mich	 allerdings,	 aber	
egoistischer bin Ich dadurch nich um ein Haar mehr als Andere, die unter den Menschen bleiben und 
Ihres Umgangs sich freuen”. M. Stirner, Max Stirner’s Kleinere..., op.cit., p. 142.
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prevent people from being at the same time a capable of cooperation social beings 
(what	is	seen	even	at	Hobbes	–	social	contract	is	a	formula	of	cooperation).
For Stirner an egoistic individual is simultaneously a social being and it is egoism 
that   encourages him or her to seek for authentic closeness of another man. There-
fore,	likewise	as	Aristotle,	Stirner	convinces	“Not	isolation	or	being	alone,	but	soci-
ety,	is	man’s	original	state.	Our	existence	begins	with	the	most	intimate	conjunction,	
as	we	are	already	living	with	our	mother	before	we	breathe;	when	we	see	the	light	of	
the	world,	we	at	once	lie	on	a	human	being’s	breast	again,	her	love	cradles	us	in	the	
lap,	leads	us	in	the	go-cart,	and	chains	us	to	her	person	with	a	thousand	ties.	Society	
is our state of nature”.32 Community is our natural instinct, natural need and neces-
sity.	It	provides	us	not	only	with	fulfillment	of	spiritual	and	emotional	needs,	which	
all	of	us	have,	but	also	allows	us	 to	multiply	our	strength	so	 that	we	can	achieve	
those	goals,	which	we	would	have	never	achieved	alone.	Associations	established	
for	reaching	such	objectives,	that	we	spontaneously	create	within	the	framework	of	
free	social	practice,	Stirner	defines	as	“unions	of	egoists”	(Verein der Egoisten).
These are collectivities of an utilitarian nature, professing the reciprocity princi-
ple	and	strategy	“tit	for	tat”:	“(...)	I	would	rather	be	referred	to	men’s	selfishness	than	
to their ‘kindnesses’, their mercy, pity, etc. The former demands reciprocity (as thou 
to	me,	so	I	to	thee),	does	nothing	‘gratis’,	and	may	be	won	and—bought”.33 Every 
member of such an association simultaneously uses and is being used. Joining the 
“association”	individuals	agree	to	such	exploitation.	However,	if	such	an	association	
ceases	to	fulfill	ends,	with	which	an	individual	identifies,	then	the	association	is	no	
longer useful for him/her and he or she resigns from the association. A sine qua non 
of	 the	“union	of	egoists”	 is	a	voluntary	character	of	participation	 in	 it.	 “For	who	
has	seen	that	egoists	associated	anytime	there,	where	one	of	them	was	a	slave	or	an	
owner	of	the	body	of	the	other	one?	Indeed,	egoists	exist	in	such	a	community	and	in	
so	far	it	could	be	seemingly	called	an	“egoistic	union”;	however,	slaves	joined	this	
association undoubtedly not out of egoism and in their egoistic hearts they are rather 
against	this	“beautiful”	association.	(...).	Societies,	in	which	the	needs	of	ones	are	
met	at	the	expense	of	others,	in	which	for	instance	ones	can	fulfill	the	need	for	calm	
by	the	fact	that	others	must	work	to	the	point	of	fainting,	or	they	live	a	prosperous	
life	thanks	to	others’	living	in	poverty	and	dying	of	hunger;	or	they	lead	a	wanton	
lifestyle since others are so stupid to live in misery (...) are religious societies, com-
munities	held	in	sacred	respect	by	law,	statute	and	all	formalities	or	ceremonies	of	
justice”.34 “Free riding” is eliminated in such unions by their ad hoc and dynamic 
32 Idem, The Ego..., op. cit., p. 406/407.
33 Ibidem, p. 413.
34	“Haben	sich	die	“Egoisten”	vereint,	wo	Einer	des	Andern	Sklave	oder	Leibeigener	ist?	Es	sind	zwar	
Egoisten in einer solchen Gesellschaft, und in sofern könnten sie mit einigen Anschein ein ‘egoistischer 
Verein’	 genannt	 warden;	 aber	 die	 Sklaven	 haben	 wahrlich	 nicht	 aus	 Egoismus	 diese	 Gesellschaft	
aufgesucht und sind vielmehr in ihrem egoistischen Herzen gegen diese schönen ‘Vereine’(…). 
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character.	Somebody,	who	wants	to	use	strength	of	others	without	reciprocity,	is	sim-
ply	expelled	from	the	union	in	such	a	way	that	all	others,	who	still	want	to	cooperate,	
cease	to	enter	into	any	relationships	with	him.	Contrary	to	formalized	social	struc-
tures,	e.g.	a	state,	where	relationships	are	maintained	by	the	external	coercion	and	
imposed standards of behavior and consists in unilateral exploitation (for example 
taxes),	in	the	union	of	egoists	relationships	between	members	are	shaped	only	by	the	
members themselves, by their individual interests and needs.
So	it	turns	out	that	“the	wild	freedom	to	place	a	knife	in	somebody’s	abdomen”,	
within	 the	 framework	of	 the	union	of	 egoists	will	 be	practically	 excluded	by	 the	
spontaneous self-limitation and socialization of its members. “But in reference to 
liberty State and union are subject to no essential difference” – asserts Stirner – 
“The	latter	can	just	as	little	come	into	existence,	or	continue	in	existence,	without	
liberty’s	being	limited	in	all	sorts	of	ways,	as	the	State	is	compatible	with	unmeas-
ured	liberty.	Limitation	of	liberty	is	inevitable	everywhere,	for	one	cannot	get	rid of 
everything”.35	These	limitations	are	forced	by	a	will	of	effective	implementation	of	
goals	by	everyone.	These	individuals,	who	are	incapable	of	imposing	such	restraints	
on themselves and consequently obeying to them, lose the ability to reach goals, 
which	are	impossible	to	achieve	alone.	Thus,	they	also	lose	a	possibility	of	meeting	
many	fundamental	needs	like	for	instance	a	need	for	security,	fulfillment	of	which	
is	only	possible	with	the	agreement	with	others.	Stirner	believes	that	joining	such	a	
union	of	security	with	somebody,	who	is	incapable	of	obeying	rules	of	security,	is	
most	often	a	result	of	an	error	of	our	assessment,	correction	of	which	is	only	a	matter	
of time. Of course, similarly as in existing states, in the above described model of 
social relationships individuals can never feel fully safe. Nevertheless, according to 
Stirner,	such	a	constant	vigilance	is	a	beneficial	phenomenon	that	stimulates	human	
activity	and	enterprise.	Continuous	competition	in	seeking	new	strategic	alliances	
for	effective	fulfillment	of	your	own	needs	and	security	enables	individuals	not	to	
fall	into	stagnancy.	So	it	is	an	psychological	argumentation,	in	which	competition	is	
perceived	as	a	beneficial	factor	of	human	development.	Moreover,	we	can	read	this	
element	of	Stirner’s	conception	as	a	factor,	which	evolutionary	game	theory	calls	a	
“threat”, i. e. a threat necessary for shaping long-term cooperation strategies.
For Stirner spontaneously evolving “unions of egoists” constitute the most natu-
ral and at the same time the most perfect formula of collective human existence. The 
lack of coercion in the objective sense distinguishes them from the state. The lack of 
Gesellschaften,	 in	welchen	die	Bedürfnisse	 der	Einen	 auf	Kosten	der	Andern	befriegigt	warden,	 in	
denen	z.B.	die	Einen	das	Bedürfniss	der	Ruhe	dadurch	befriedigen	können,	das	die	Andern	bis	zur	
Erschlaffung	arbeiten	müssen,	ode	rein	Wohlleben	dadurch	führen,	das	die	Andere	kümmerlich	leben,	ja	
wohl	gar	verhungern;	oder	prassen,	weil	Andere	so	thöricht	sind	zu	darben	(…)	vielmehr	eine	religiöse	
Gesellschaft, eine Ceremonien der Gerechtigkeit in heiligen Respect gehaltene Gemeinde ist.” Idem, 
Max Stirner’s Kleinere..., op. cit., p. 163/164.
35 Idem, The Ego..., op. cit., p. 409.
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coercion	in	the	subjective	sense	–	from	the	society.	“The	union	will	assuredly	offer	
a	greater	measure	of	 liberty,	as	well	as	 (and	especially	because	by	 it	one	escapes	
all the coercion peculiar to State and society life) admit of being considered as “a 
new	 liberty””.36	 In	Stirner’s	opinion,	 the	 society	 is	 also	oppressive,	which	 results	
among	others	from	established,	static	rules	and	social	norms,	by	which	the	society	
is governed. Therefore creation of moral standards in the “union of egoists” – dis-
tinguished	from	state	and	society	-	must	be	based	on	mutual	agreements	between	its	
members,	interested	in	pursuing	their	own	interests	and	maximizing	their	own	ben-
efits.	Stirner	presents	here	an	early	form	of	the	conception,	which	is	now	developed	
by such contemporary libertarian thinkers like David Gauthier. Gauthier’s ethically 
naturalist project, presented in Morals by Agreement, starts from the assumption of 
moral	vacuum,	from	which	-	using	compromises	and	 logic	of	 iterated	“prisoner’s	
dilemmas” – emerges a contractual morality, being an result of permanent and free 
cooperation	 between	members	 of	 society.37	 For	 Stirner	 such	morality	 has	 always	
a	dynamic	 and	 spontaneous	 character	 and	 its	 development	never	definitely	 stops,	
adapting its norms to the changing social conditions and goals of members of the 
union	of	egoists.	It	can	be	never	definitely	ossified	and	established,	because	it	means	
an	inability	to	change	it	according	to	will	of	its	members	and	such	an	inability	would	
convert the union of egoists in the state or society and ruin the sheer sense of its cre-
ation,	which	is	a	simplifying	of	relations	between	really	existing	individuals.	Using	
the	metaphor	derived	from	new	institutional	economics,	it	can	be	said	that	the	sole	
sense	of	developing	of	such	a	minimal	moral	standards	may	be	the	lowering	of	trans-
action costs of the mutual cooperation.
In	this	vision	of	minimal	social	organization,	Stirner	doesn’t	find	any	place	for	
social institutions exceeding these dynamic standards and rules of morality being 
the minimum necessary to cooperation. Looking from this deeply anarchic point of 
view	the	state	and	its	oppressive	statutory	laws	are	of	course	completely	excluded	
as the norms regulating behavior of the members in the union of egoists. What’s 
more,	subjectivism	of	Stirner’s	approach	excludes	not	only	obeying	statutory	laws	
but	also	natural	 laws,	because	 they	have	a	supraindividual,	abstract	and	objective	
character, and as such they can produce excessive coercion. The norms of the natural 
law	are	generally	independent	from	the	will	of	the	society	members,	who	in	fact	have	
no direct impact on their content. It makes this norms imposed and authoritarian. 
However,	Stirner’s	conception	is	radically	antiauthoritarian,	and	as	such,	anarchist	
in the basic meaning of the term of anarchism, because of the rejection of each su-
pra-individual	authority.	It	rejects	not	only	the	authority	of	statutory	law,	but	also	
authority	produced	by	social	institutions	such	as	natural	law,	morality	and	religion.	
From	this	point	of	view	accepted	are	only	limitations	imposed	by	a	voluntary	deci-
36 Ibidem, p. 409/410.
37 D. Gauthier, Morals by Agreement, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1968.
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sion	or	agreement,	being	in	perfect	accordance	with	the	own	interest	and	needs	of	an	
individual. Property rights, if understood as an element of spontaneous order, i. e. 
the set of useful rules of conduct dynamically regulating the course of free inter-in-
dividual	practices	and	serving	protection	of	an	individual’s	ownership,	are	accepted	
by	Stirner.	However,	at	the	moment	when	these	rules	converts	into	abstract	universal	
standards	of	behavior,	being	independent	from	the	will	of	union	members,	they	be-
come another source of the external authority and excessive coercion. At the moment 
they are no more useful for members of the union of egoists. Thus, such an attitude 
towards	property rights does not mean questioning their common validity, but only 
rejection of dogmatism in their understanding.38
4. Conclusions
 Stirner’s conception could be perceived as a post-romantic correction, on the one 
hand, of a psychological utilitarianism, and on the other hand – of the dogmatism 
of	these	Enlightenment	concepts,	which	are	based	on	the	natural	law	theory.39 From 
the representatives of utilitarianism such as J. Bentham or J. S. Mill, Stirner adopts 
the	assumption	of	maximizing	benefits,	but	at	the	same	time	he	rejects	the	utilitar-
ian assumption, that human preferences, needs, goals and values can be expressed 
in the language of the universal, common and objective categories. For him, needs 
and	preferences	in	the	social	sphere	are	changeable	and	impossible	to	define	unam-
biguously and universally, and human conduct is dependent on variable, subjective, 
individual	criteria	and	motives,	which	cannot	be	captured	into	any	static	principles	
and rules.40 Therefore, he is convinced that there is no such possibility to determine 
positively any set of universal human goals and aspirations, and consequently, there 
is	no	possibility	to	define	universally	the	human	nature,	as	Enlightenment	thinkers	
do. So if you can intuitively say about a human, that he or she aims to maximization 
of	his	or	her	own	benefit,	then	you	are	not	able	to	create	a	universal	utilitarian	calcu-
lus, and thus it is also impossible to establish any static and universal institution (e.g. 
properly	organized	state),	that	would	provide	such	a	maximization.	Thus,	if	we	want	
to	institutionally	guarantee	this	maximization,	then	the	only	way	is	to	offer	freedom	
to individuals, let them to conform to the principles and practices of “laissez faire”.
However,	we	must	remember	that	for	Stirner	freedom	can	be	understood	in	a	lot	
of	various	ways,	and	its	positive	content	is	dependent	only	on	the	subjective	aspira-
tions, goals, strengths and abilities of each individual. Consequently, there is no pos-
sibility	to	fall	into	Rousseau’s	paradox	of	“forcing	to	freedom”,	which	is	connected	
38 Ibidem, p. 326 ff.
39 For	more	details	see:	M.	Chmieliński,	Max Stirner. Jednostka, Społeczeństwo, Państwo [Max Stirner. 
The Individual, the Society, the State],	Kraków,	Księgarnia	Akademicka,	2006,	p.	9.
40 M. Stirner, Max Stirner’s Kleinere..., op. cit., p. 358.
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with	metaphysical	(in	Stirner’s	opinion	-	“theological”)	perspectives	of	positive	free-
dom	forcing	us	to	act	only	in	accordance	with	the	“only	true”	content	of	it.	This	man-
ner of understanding freedom – as a full liberty of choice of action, or not restrained 
decision-making autonomy of an individual, excludes putting it in the categories of 
natural	law.	Natural	law	theories	assume	for	Stirner	adopting	the	metaphysical	cate-
gories	and	unnecessary	fictions	like	for	instance	the	assumption	that	freedom	of	the	
one	individual	is	to	be	internally	limited	by	the	freedom	of	the	other,	whereas	it	is	
only	the	power,	which	limits	it.	In	other	words,	it	is	ours	everyday	experience,	which	
excludes such a metaphysical limitations of human behavior. It is assessed not only 
by	war	crimes	but	also	by	common,	ordinary	offences	and	everyday’s	violations	of	
freedom.	Hence,	we	adopt	metaphysical	conceptions	of	freedom	which	is	limited	by	
the equal freedom of others only sola fide, i. e. similarly to religious dogmas. Stirner 
does	not	want	to	continue	this	metaphysical,	“religious”	tradition	in	the	defense	of	
freedom of concrete individual (although as I have pointed above, his vision of an 
individual’s	freedom	in	the	union	of	egoists	must	also	be	compatible	with	freedom	of	
other	individuals).	That’s	why	he	adopts	the	assumption	of	subjectivist	egoism	and	
individual	utility	as	only	values	being	worthy	of	the	unconditional	maintenance	and	
the same reasons are also behind his relativisation of any other values, including the 
value of freedom itself.
We can accuse this Stirner’s stance of overlooking the fact that the defense of 
self-realization and good of human being appealing to the utilitarian category of the 
maximization of a subjectively understood individual utility, actually results in loos-
ing	these	goals,	which	are	objects	of	the	defense.	The	subjectivistic	egoism	doesn’t	
prevent	enslavement	of	others	by	the	enslaver,	who	fulfills	in	this	way	his	or	her	own	
egoistic	aspirations.	It	is	today	easy	to	imagine	such	a	situation,	in	which	to	maxi-
mize	of	our	own	subjective	benefit,	we	decide	to	be	fully	subjected	to	the	power	of	
the soft despotism (of the state or other “master”), because it can ensure the funda-
mental	needs	and	goals	of	us	(in	present-day	states	we	in	fact	often	find	ourselves	in	
such	a	situation).	Although	such	care	will	be	surely	tantamount	to	the	enslavement,	
the	majority	of	our	individual	needs	may	be	really	fulfilled	in	this	soft	or	“benevo-
lent” despotism. Thus, appealing to the subjective maximization of utility is a very 
imperfect	tool	of	defense	of	freedom.	Robert	Nozick	shows	the	weakness	of	such	
an	argumentation	in	his	figure	of	an	“utility	monster”	(enslavement	of	others	in	the	
name	of	own	egoistic	desires)	and	“experience	machine”.	Namely	Nozick	encour-
ages	us	to	imagine	the	“experience	machine”,	which	would	give	us	the	possibility	to	
substitute	for	our	real	life	by	the	identical	to	real,	but	imagined	experiences,	which	
we	subjectively	recognize	solely	as	pleasant.	Assuming	that	the	highest	human	need	
is to maximize pleasure and avoid distress (as for example by J. Bentham or J.S. Mill 
but also by J.Locke)41,	a	life	in	such	a	machine	would	have	to	be	the	highest	end	of	
41 J. Bentham, “Rationale of Judicial Evidence”, in The Works of Jeremy Bentham, T. VI, Edinburgh, 
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each	human	beeing.	Meanwhile,	Nozick	says,	only	very	few	of	us	would	probably	
be interested in such a life.42 It is because it is impossible to reduce a human life to 
egoistic use based on the utilitarian principle of maximin. 
Therefore, defending the real freedom of a particular human individual and 
avoiding the Rousseauian metaphysical trap of “forcing to freedom”, Stirner has fell 
into	the	trap	of	subjectivism,	which	consists	in	impossibility	to	universalize	any	pos-
tulates. Hence, they all must have subjective, and thus particular dimension. Thus, 
in	his	uncompromised	striving	for	the	defense	of	autonomy	and	self-ownership	in	
the	categories	of	individual	utility,	Stirner	does	not	perceive	that,	what	libertarians	
seems to see: that only a kind of the “metaphysical” dogmatism of natural rights the-
ory enables the relatively effective defense of values such as life, freedom and prop-
erty,	which	are	central	values	from	the	egoist	self-realization’s	perspective.	In	other	
words,	he	does	not	 recognize	 that	 even	 though	 the	Platonic	choice	between	 truth	
and justice in the social sphere – in favor of primacy of dogma of justice – means 
“hypocrisy”, it is the minimum of hypocrisy being necessary for the protection of 
William	Tait,	1838-1843,	p.	35,	257.	Bentham	unilaterally	connects	egoism	with	hedonism.	Defining	
the notion of interest, he refers to the category of pleasure and distress. He believes that in order to 
understand	what	a	motive	is,	you	always	should	look	at	distress	and	pleasure.	“With	respect	to	goodness	
and	badness,	as	it	is	with	everything	else	that	is	not	itself	either	pain	or	pleasure,	so	is	with	motives.	If	
they are good or bad, it is only on account of their effects: good, on account of their tendency to produce 
pleasure or avert pain: Bad, on account of their tendency to produce pain, or avert pleasure” (Idem, 
Principles of Morals and Legislation, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1823, p. 102). Mill is also convinced 
about	 the	necessity	of	relating	utilitarianism	to	psychological	hedonism.	He	writes	 that	“Those	who	
know	anything	about	the	matter	are	aware	that	every	writer,	from	Epicurus	to	Bentham,	who	maintained	
the theory of utility, meant by it, not something to be contradistinguished from pleasure, but pleasure 
itself,	together	with	exemption	from	pain;	and	instead	of	opposing	the	useful	to	the	agreeable	or	the	
ornamental,	have	always	declared	that	the	useful	means	these,	among	other	things.”.	Further	he	writes:	
“The	creed	which	accepts	as	the	foundation	of	morals,	Utility,	or	the	Greatest	Happiness	Principle,	holds	
that	actions	are	right	in	proportion	as	they	tend	to	promote	happiness,	wrong	as	they	tend	to	produce	
the	reverse	of	happiness.	By	happiness	is	intended	pleasure,	and	the	absence	of	pain;	by	unhappiness,	
pain,	and	the	privation	of	pleasure.	To	give	a	clear	view	of	the	moral	standard	set	up	by	the	theory,	much	
more	requires	to	be	said;	in	particular,	what	things	it	includes	in	the	ideas	of	pain	and	pleasure;	and	to	
what	extent	this	is	left	an	open	question.	But	these	supplementary	explanations	do	not	affect	the	theory	
of	life	on	which	this	theory	of	morality	is	grounded	–	namely,	that	pleasure,	and	freedom	from	pain,	are	
the	only	things	desirable	as	ends;	and	that	all	desirable	things	(which	are	as	numerous	in	the	utilitarian	
as in any other scheme) are desirable either for the pleasure inherent in themselves, or as means to the 
promotion of pleasure and the prevention of pain.” (J. S. Mill, Utilitarianism and On Liberty, London, 
Blackwell	Publishing,	2003,	p.	185,	186).	According	to	Locke:	“Things	then	are	good	or	evil,	only	in	
reference	to	pleasure	or	pain.	That	we	call	good,	which	is	apt	to	cause	or	increase	pleasure,	or	diminish	
pain in us.” (J. Locke, “An Essay Concerning Human Understanding”, in John Locke, Works in Nine 
Volumes, Vol I, London, Rivington et al., 1823, p. 216). In my opinion, one of the best analyses of the 
logical structure of utilitarianism still remains: (J. Plamenatz, The English Utilitarians, Oxford, Basil 
Blackwell,	New	York,	Macmillan,	1949).
42 R. Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia,	New	York,	Basic	Books,	1974,	p.	42-45.
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justice.43	The	justice	in	the	case	of	libertarians	is	certainly	strictly	connected	with	the	
protection	of	freedom	and	ownership	of	each	individual.	
In my opinion, it does not mean that Stirner’s project should be seen as a fail-
ure.44	Similarly	as	libertarians,	Stirner	fights	with	the	kind	of	a	political	philosophy,	
which	subjects	an	individual	to	the	state	or	holistically	understood	society	and	there-
fore makes he or she the slave of social and political institutions. Although, if the 
main enemy of libertarianism is an ideology supporting contemporary social state 
(e.g.	Rawls)	and	justifying	its	“soft	despotism”,	then	Stirner’s	enemy	is	the	absolute	
Prussian	monarchy	and	connected	with	it	-	Hegelian	state	ideology.45 This makes a 
big	difference	and	determines	a	kind	of	used	weapon.46 We should remember that 
Hegelianism recognizes the state as a manifestation of higher ethical unity, the au-
thority	of	which	all	the	members	has	to	be	absolutely	subordinated,	and	that	this	idea	
was	in	the	beginning	of	the	20th century used as a source of inspiration i. e. by Italian 
43 H. Kelsen, “What is Justice?”, in Collected Essays by Hans Kelsen,	 New	 Jersey,	The	 Lawbook	
Exchange Union, 2000, p. 82.
44	 Otherwise:	 G.	 Keben,	 “John	 Henry	 Mackay	 und	 sein	 Philosoph”,	 in	 Monatsblätter. Organ der 
‘Breslauer Dichterschule’,	Bd.	16,	Heft	12,	Dezember,	1890,	p.	174;	R.	W.	K.	Paterson,	The Nihilistic 
Egoist Max Stirner,	London-New	York-Toronto,	Oxford	University	Press,	1971,	p.	32.
45  Hegel	in	his	justification	of	Prussian	monarchical	absolutism	wrote	among	others:	“In	the	government	
—	regarded	as	organic	totality	—	the	sovereign	power	(principate)	is	(a) subjectivity as the infinite 
self-unity	of	 the	notion	 in	 its	 development;	—	 the	 all-sustaining,	 all-decreeing	will	 of	 the	 state,	 its	
highest	peak	and	all-pervasive	unity.	In	the	perfect	form	of	the	state,	in	which	each	and	every	element	
of the notion has reached free existence, this subjectivity is not a so-called ‘moral person’, or a decree 
issuing	from	a	majority	(forms	in	which	the	unity	of	the	decreeing	will	has	not	an	actual existence), but 
an	actual	individual	—	the	will	of	a	decreeing	individual,	—	monarchy. The monarchical constitution 
is	therefore	the	constitution	of	developed	reason:	all	other	constitutions	belong	to	lower	grades	of	the	
development and realization of reason.” (G. W. F. Hegel, Hegel’s Philosophy of Mind: Being Part Three 
of the Encyclopaedia of Philosophical Sciences, trans. W. Wallace, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1971, § 
542).
46  It	 is	 worth	 mentioning	 that	 Stirner	 is	 one	 of	 few	 political	 German	 writers	 so	 unambiguously	
criticizing the tyranny and calling for granting individuals a right to resist. The vast majority of German 
authors, and here among others regarded as a liberal Immanuel Kant does not grant such a right to 
anyone.	Mandt	and	Böhme	write	among	others	about	sources	of	this	phenomenon.	Mandt	perceives	
causes	of	this	phenomenon	on	the	German	ground	in	the	lack	of	knowledge	about	tyranny	and	right	
to	resist	suitable	for	e.g.	for	Anglo-Saxons	(Tyrrannislehre,	Widerstandsrecht).	In	connection	with	it,	
it has not developed in Germany, according to her, a conviction being one of the quality of a civil 
society,	that	within	the	framework	of	citizenship	there	exists	also	a	right	to	speak	against	the	tyrannical	
authority.	Any	objections	towards	the	authority	had	thus	partisan	and	extra-civic	character.	They	were	
not perceived as a natural means of the defense of the society, but as means violating licensed social 
and political order and as such rejected. It is actually because of these reasons, in Mandt’s opinion, 
uprisings	were	so	rare	in	Germany,	and	any	changes	were	made	centrally,	exactly	on	the	initiative	of	
people	 in	power.	(H.	Mandt,	Tyrannislehre und Widerstandsrecht. Studien zur deutschen politischen 
Theorie des 19. Jahrhunderts,	Darmstadt	und	Neuwied,	Luchterhand,	1974,	p.	 108,	297	and	n.;	H.	
Böhme (hrsg.), Prolegomena zu einer Sozial-und Wirtschaftsgeschichte Deutschland im 19 und 20 
Jahrhundert, Frankfurt am M., Suhrkamp, 1968, p. 23).
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fascists. It means that the state is evaluated by Hegel extremely highly. For him the 
state becomes the highest point of reference for the political sphere and therefore, 
the	unique	institution	being	able	to	dialectically	unite	two	contradictory	elements	of	
the social/political sphere: the contractual, economic rationality of the civil socie-
ty	with	the	traditional,	very	often	irrational	elements	of	community	(family).	“The	
State	is	the	self−conscious	ethical	substance,	the	unification	of	the	family	principle	
with	that	of	civil	society.	The	same	unity,	which	is	in	the	family	as	a	feeling	of	love,	
is	its	essence,	receiving,	however,	at	the	same	time	through	the	second	principle	of	
conscious and spontaneously active volition the form of conscious universality. This 
universal	principle,	with	all	its	evolution	in	detail,	is	the	absolute	aim	and	content	
of	the	knowing	subject,	which	thus	identifies	itself	in	its	volition	with	the	system	of	
reasonableness”.47	Thus,	the	state	becomes	in	Hegel’s	view	an	ultimate	universe	of	
the	social	and	political	sphere,	by	which	morality,	ethic	and	customs	are	dialectically	
absorbed	and	used	for	protection	of	its	interests	and	power.	For	the	consistent	indi-
vidualist	like	Stirner,	this	interests	and	power	means	of	course	interests	and	power	of	
those	people,	who	currently	are	staying	in	power	or	who,	as	Hegel,	are	formulating	
official	justifications	of	power.	Thus,	we	have	to	remember	that	the	main	enemy	of	
Stirner is the philosophy and practice of the bureaucratic Prussian state in the half of 
the 19th	century,	which	has	created	one	of	the	most	powerful	bureaucratic	ethoses	in	
Europe,	one	of	the	aspects	of	which	was	the	absolute	subordination	of	the	individual	
to the raison d’etat and the monarch. It is this concrete Prussian social and political 
context,	which	makes	Stirner	write:	“All	Things	are	nothing	to	me”.	Prussian	milita-
ristic	and	bureaucratic	monarchy	requires	full	sacrifice	from	an	individual:	either	in	
a	military	or	official	service,	or	as	a	cantonal	peasant	and	factory	worker.	The	service	
has to be the most important element of life of the member of the Prussian state. The 
omnipresent, enslaving and oppressive atmosphere of this ethos causes that only a 
radical resistance against it is possible. The radical enslavement causes the radical 
resistance. The force of reaction is proportional to the force of action.
47 G. W. F. Hegel, op. cit., § 535.
